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A thought experiment demonstrates that physicalism about consciousness entails a para-
doxical duplication of physical information. Moreover, objective existence acquires the status
of a physical property. To avoid this paradox, one requires a concept of objectivity in which
individuation is finite and incomplete. Finite individuation requires objective uncertainty and is
thus corroborated by the contemporary sciences. Finite individuation and objective uncer-
tainty prevent existence from becoming a physical property, thus defeating physicalism about
consciousness and resolving the paradox.
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Problem statement: duplication of physical information?
Suppose there is an observer who knows that an object exists.The observer’s knowledge includes a description of theobject, which would allow other observers to recognize it and
which contains the same physical information for all observers.
Further, suppose that another observer observes the brain (or
whatever the relevant supervenience base of a state of knowledge
is) of the first observer. Then, assuming that mental states are for
all empirical purposes brain states, the second observer obtains the
same physical information from the study of the first observer’s
brain as from the study of the object, although the two may forever
be causally disconnected. Indeed, suppose the first observer con-
templates an actually existing table from her first-person per-
spective without having any causal connection with the object. For
example, suppose she is sitting with her eyes closed and recalling
the table. The second observer observes her relevant brain state,
which is a supervenience base for the intentional content. For the
purposes of this thought experiment, the first observer is the brain
state while the second one observes this brain state. At this point, it
does not matter whether the observers have different access to
qualia, emotions, or any other experiential content. What matters
is that both have cognitive access to the same physical information
about the table, assuming that the mental state is the brain state at
least in the sense that there is no empirically observable difference
between the two. Therefore, the second observer obtains the
information about the table from the brain state of the first
observer as long as the latter thinks about the table. Notice that the
second observer does not need to study the brain–environment
correlations because the brain state already contains the relevant
information about the object.
This capacity to obtain information about the table from the
brain state of the first observer is paradoxical because it requires a
duplication of physical information in the world. If additional
observers are involved, the duplication becomes multiplication.
The paradox consists in the apparent ability of one physical fact
(the brain state) to convey information about the existence of
another, although there seems to be no physical reason for that.
The actual discovery of this duplication of information would,
therefore, mean the discovery of correlations between physical
events, which are not mediated by any causal interaction. For
example, anyone could learn everything an initial observer knows
about this particular table without having access to the table itself
but only to the first observer’s brain. However, one needs only to
assume that there is an observable physical supervenience base of
a conscious state for such a paradox to arise.
Let us now consider how this approach to consciousness differs
from the traditional physicalist story of supervenience. The dif-
ference is subtle and yet significant. To use Jackson’s expression,
physicalism claims that it tells a complete story about the world
while using only physical descriptions (Jackson, 1998, p. 9). First,
physicalism requires supervenience, possibly of the strong variety:
“A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x
and each property F in A, if x has F, then there is a property G in
B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y has G, it has F” (Kim,
1984, p. 165). The relationship between supervenience and phy-
sicalism is not without controversies, including those regarding
the differences between types of supervenience (see Bennett, 2004;
Moyer, 2008). More importantly, supervenience cannot fully
define physicalism because it cannot ensure that only physical
objects exist or that they produce mental qualities (see an
excellent review of this topic in Wilson, 2005). The above thought
experiment suggests that this is because of a fundamental pro-
blem with physicalism: There is no supervenience base from
which the external observer acquires information about physical
states of affairs that the respective conscious state contains in the
first-person perspective. Let us consider this in detail.
Let us adopt Jackson’s definition of physicalism: “Any world
which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate
simpliciter” (Jackson, 1998, p. 12). It is reasonable to assume that
any sufficiently complex mental state is at least partly intentional
and at least partly “about” a certain state of affairs, even if this state
of affairs is another mental state. Treating the aboutness relation
generously, one can accommodate cases of delusions and other
deviations from the faithful reflection of reality. The subsequent
discussion accommodates such cases as well. In the classical
physicalist story, the supervenience base must be causally con-
nected to the object of intention, independently of whether the
mental content is externalist or internalist. Lacking such a causal
connection, there is something about a mental state that one
cannot possibly know from the supervenience base. For example,
there must be a causal connection between the table an individual
contemplates and the brain state responsible for this contempla-
tion. If the individual has a hallucination and the table is not there,
a causal connection between previous experiences of tables and the
present brain state must remain. This physicalist story, which may
appear to be common sense, implicitly informs the mainstream
empirically oriented discussions of conscious states (see, for
example, Graziano, 2019). As the above thought experiment
shows, however, the story has a problem. The causal linkage
between the object of intention and the supervenience base of the
conscious intentional state cannot simply record the information
about the object of intention within the supervenience base. In
fact, it is not the supervenience base but a combination of the
supervenience base and the causal linkage with the object that
records the information. Alternatively, the information may reside
in the causal regularities responsible for the causal connection, if
such regularities exist. Scratches on a table are signs of its long
history, but one cannot learn about this history from the scratches
themselves; rather one must learn the processes of their emer-
gence. Therefore, to avoid the absurdity of acausal information
transfer, the supervenience base of any conscious state must
include everything. This makes the supervenience story empirically
irrelevant because no empirical conclusion is possible from the
knowledge that the whole world is now the supervenience base for
a conscious state. One may object that this argument freely uses
the intentional concept of information in an extensional context,
but then so does the physicalist, insisting that the observer learns
everything about the carrier of information—the conscious state—
from the respective physical one.
The information to be duplicated is twofold: the description of
the object and the fact of its existence. The second observer not
only learns that the first one thinks of a table. If the first observer
thinks of the table as existing, this part of information is also
available to the second observer. If the first observer is not sure
whether the table under a given description exists, the second
observer also knows about this uncertainty. Without this second
component, there is no duplication of physical information in the
sense of information about actually existing objects. One may be
tempted to suggest, as a way of avoiding (if not resolving) the
paradox, that this second component be somehow excluded.
However, it seems impossible to construct the thought experi-
ment so that the first observer simply thinks of a table without
ascribing to it an ontological status of an existing or imaginary
object. As argued below, this makes the paradox of duplication a
problem of construing objectivity or, to be more precise, the
difference between appearance and reality.
The duplication paradox as a problem of objectivity. It is useful
to look at this situation from the perspective of the first observer.
Here, the knowledge that the table exists (under a description)
implies two things. First, there is a positing of a table as existing
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out there. This external existence imposes a constraint on sub-
jective experience: The table is being observed “under a descrip-
tion”. The positing of the object as existing entails a certain
arbitrariness in the choice of the description under which it is
being observed. The respective constraint on the expected
experience can be weaker (a fleeting thought about tables in
general) or stronger (a detailed observation of a specific table that
must be repaired). In any case, this constraint restricts the
expectations of the observer regarding his or her experience and
thereby reduces the subjective uncertainty about it. It would,
therefore, be appropriate to call this constraint a “constraint on
expected experience”.
Such constraints are, to varying degrees, intersubjectively valid,
that is to say, common for different observers. The intersubjective
validity of a constraint means “communicability”: another observer
must be able to reproduce the experience of the constraint from its
description. The strength of the constraint and its intersubjective
validity jointly measure the engagement of the observer with the
external reality. Now if the first observer is herself an objectively
describable physical object, there can be an observer who obtains
the content of the first observer’s thoughts from the supervenience
base of the relevant state of knowledge, belief, or perception. If this
is the case, all constraints on experience become intersubjectively
valid. This can be seen as the duplication paradox from the point of
view of the first observer whose subjective experience is translated
into physical information. Such a translation may not be a
particularly paradoxical situation per se. Indeed, if successful, it will
produce a physicalist description of a conscious state. However, the
duplication paradox is the cost to be paid for this hypothetical
“objectification” of the subjective.
An ontological interpretation of the duplication paradox. The
paradox has the following ontological interpretation. If the
supervenience base of a conscious state is observable, there is a
description of a physical state that contains information about the
existence of this state itself as well as other objects. This makes
existence part of a physical description. Existence becomes a piece
of physical information. This ontological implication of physic-
alism can also be reversed: If one denies that existence is a piece
of physical information, one also avoids the duplication of phy-
sical information.
Subjectivity in the duplication paradox. This ontological inter-
pretation allows us to define the duplication paradox as an
expression of the subjective—the elusive, self-referential “some-
thing” that somehow is us, including the author of these words.
Exemplified by all possible qualia, emotions, and thoughts, the
subjective makes the duplication paradox even more paradoxical:
If one can describe the supervenience base of a conscious state,
there exists a physical description that implies the existence of its
referent. Such an outcome is clearly undesirable.
Objectivity and the limit on individuation
At the heart of the paradox lies objectivity, that is to say, the
independence of objects from conscious observation of and
knowledge about them. The following discussion demonstrates
that the duplication paradox is essentially a paradox of objectivity.
The received wisdom and its shortcomings. As Debs and Red-
head note, objectivity “is, curiously, both much debated and
neglected within philosophy of science. It is much debated in the
sense that it is often highly contested, yet its relative neglect is
evident in that no single definition of the term dominates, even as a
foil for critique” (Debs and Redhead, 2007, p. 159). Still, one
approach can be deemed relatively dominant: objectivity as
symmetry or invariance with respect to transformations that are
deemed “unphysical”, that is to say, observer-dependent. Weyl is
the classical reference in this regard: “Objectivity is invariance with
respect to the group of automorphisms” (Weyl, 1982, p. 132).
The classical example of objectivity as symmetry is invariance
with respect to a coordinate change: The physical meaning of a
description of an object should not depend on the choice of
coordinates. Another one, historically directly connected with
Weyl’s conception (Ryckman, 2003, p. 77; see also Ryckman,
2009), is the gauge invariance of the electromagnetic field: The
theory is invariant with respect to a certain formal transforma-
tion, which does not represent a physical change (see the concept
of theoretical symmetry in Healey, 2007, Ch. 6; also Ismael and
van Fraassen, 2003). This approach inspired Nozick’s conception
of objectivity as invariance: A “fact” is objective when invariant
with respect to “admissible transformations”, and the more
invariant, the more objective (Nozick, 2001, p. 79; see also
Earman, 2004, p. 1233, where Earman endorses a modest version
of Nozick’s proposal). Kosso summarizes this way of thinking
about objectivity: “By separating the ephemeral effects of
perspective from the enduring reality, symmetries are a key
epistemic tool, facilitating the step from appearance to reality”
(Kosso, 2003, p. 414). Ontic structural realism inherits this
invariance-based notion of objectivity: What makes structures
real is their invariance because, to quote Max Born, “[t]he feature,
which suggests reality is always some kind of invariance of a
structure independent of the aspect, the projection” (Ladyman
and Ross, 2007, p. 189). Debs and Redhead criticize the all-too-
easy equation of invariance with objectivity, noting the inability
of the former to account for many nuances of the latter (Debs and
Redhead, 2007, p. 66). However, they agree with the basic
intuition behind Weyl’s definition and develop an invariance-
based account of objectivity (Debs and Redhead, 2007, p. 72).
Still, the connection between objectivity and symmetry is far
from obvious. Denoting a purely formal change, symmetry or
invariance is a property of theories and models rather than of
objects or the relation between observers and objects. Such
theoretical symmetry entails invariance with respect to certain
variables and can thus be read off the description, independently
of the existence of the object of the description. Consequently,
one must postulate what is real before claiming a particular
symmetry to be a sufficient or necessary condition for the reality
of something. As mentioned above, gauge symmetry is widely
considered an example of symmetry based on which one can
identify objective (physical) as opposed to merely theoretical
transformations. However, the breaking of gauge symmetry does
not reduce the objectivity of the respective phenomenon. In fact,
Pierre Curie famously attributed physical information exactly to
asymmetry: “Asymmetry is what creates a phenomenon” (Curie,
2003, p. 312).
To generalize, symmetry does not constitute a sufficient
condition of objectivity because it does not, prima facie, imply
the existence of the respective object. Even when “more” symmetry
means a greater objectivity of description in some sense, this
increase in objectivity does not happen because of symmetry. For
example, the general covariance of general relativity makes general
relativity “more symmetric” than special relativity, yet general
covariance is not sufficient for the theory to be true. Indeed, one
requires empirical content as well. An analysis of intertheoretic
reduction further highlights the problems of defining objectivity as
a property of the descriptions of objects. According to the classical
definition of reduction by Ernst Nagel:
A reduction is effected when the experimental laws of the
secondary science (and if it has an adequate theory, its
theory as well) are shown to be the logical consequences of
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the theoretical assumptions (inclusive of the coordinating
definitions) of the primary science. (Nagel, 1961, p. 352)
One may suggest that reduction to more fundamental theories
renders descriptions more objective. However, the classical
example of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical
mechanics reveals that this is not the case. Statistical mechanics
can arguably predict and explain all that thermodynamics can
and more, which means that the former constrains the expected
experience to a greater extent. In fact, a more detailed description
of anything would deliver this effect, and yet this greater precision
cannot be equated with a greater objectivity because there is no
guarantee that intersubjective validity increases as well. For
example, in the Davis Wine Aroma Wheel, the “woody” fragrance
is further differentiated into “resinous”, “phenolic”, and “burned”.
However, this refinement does not help an individual who is
incapable of identifying the woodiness of wine in the first place.
Obviously, statistical mechanics is not a mere classificatory
refinement of thermodynamics, but if it is, in some sense, more
objective than thermodynamics, this greater objectivity cannot be
explained by the fact that it contains all the predictive power of
thermodynamics. Intertheoretic reduction does not contribute to
intersubjective validation: It does not make constraints on
experience more independent from the circumstances of
observation and thus more accessible for other observers.
Objectivity outside of descriptions. Let us attempt a different
approach to objectivity. Under this approach, objectivity is con-
strued not as a property of the description of an object but as an
ontological status attached to the description. This ontological
status emerges as an empirical discovery in the process of max-
imizing intersubjectively validated constraints on experience. This
is how it is done.
In the simplest version of the paradox of duplication, the act of
description posits an object as existing independently from the act
itself. The very notion of “positing” reminds us of Kant’s Position:
If you concede…as in all fairness you must, that every
existential proposition is synthetic, then how would you
assert that the predicate of existence may not be canceled
without contradiction?—since this privilege pertains only in
the analytic propositions, as resting on its very character…
Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of
something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is
merely the positing (Position) of a thing or of certain
determinations in themselves. (Kant, 1998, A 598, B 626)
This positing produces intersubjectively valid constraints on
experience. An object exists under a particular description, which
expresses these constraints. However, the existence of the object is
not implicit in this description, nor is the objectivity of the
description implicit in the description itself. Let us now maximize
these intersubjectively valid constraints on experience; that is, let
us maximize the objectivity of a description. Take the famous
Mary who never saw the color red, although she knows
everything science has to say about colors and their perception
by humans (Jackson, 1986). This imaginary situation is the
starting point of the knowledge argument against physicalism (see
Nida-Rümelin, 2002 for an overview). However, we shall use this
construction for a somewhat different purpose. Our Mary will
have a companion. Let us call him Peter. Peter does not have
Mary’s disadvantage and has seen the color red. He also shares
Mary’s scientific knowledge. If communicated in a mutually
understandable language, an objective description of a red rose
should thus be equally accessible for Mary and Peter. However,
this description cannot consist in piling together a potential
infinity of qualifiers: the color, length, form, and size of petals, for
example. If Peter characterizes the color of the rose more
precisely, this will not help Mary learn more about the rose (cf.
the above example of wine fragrances). Instead, Peter must
characterize the color in terms of wavelengths of the electro-
magnetic field and perhaps the chemical composition of the
petals. If Peter communicates this description to Mary, Mary will
be better informed, although still not capable of imagining the red
color. This means that Mary can reproduce the red object using
the information about the chemical composition of a red petal.
The success of the communication between them is possible
because Peter refers to theories and facts that Mary has learned
from her experience of other objects. These theories describe
aspects of reality available to all observers, or a “common
referential space” that consists of “things” that are to be
discovered everywhere. The reduction to a common referential
space maximizes the intersubjectively valid constraints on
experience. With or without the experience of qualia, any
sufficiently patient and fortunate observer can ultimately describe
any object in terms of molecules, atoms, elementary particles, and
fields. Indeed, electromagnetic waves are everywhere, not only
where red roses are. At the same time, the reduction to basic
physics provides additional constraints on the expected experi-
ence when compared with phenomenological descriptions of the
rose as merely “beautiful”, “red”, “fragrant”, etc.
This reduction of a phenomenological to a more “funda-
mental”—or, better still, objective—description constitutes an
explanation for how this rose can be transformed into some other
thing already known to Mary. For example, Mary understands
Peter’s message about the chemical composition of the petals as
long as she understands the commonality between a petal and
other objects whose chemical composition she already knows.
Moreover, an explanation of how a petal can be transformed into
something else is the description of the petal that Peter can
possibly communicate to an interlocutor with whom he shares
only the knowledge of chemistry and physics. Communication of
this explanation by Peter to Mary creates a common referential
space; that is to say, it increases the intersubjective validity of
constraints on experience. The discovery of this transformation of
things into other things cannot occur without the actual
transformation: The observer must become an experimenter.
The observer must change and even destroy an object to “reduce”
its qualia-based description to another more fundamental one.
This fact is crucial for the following discussion: Such an
intervention is the cost of the intersubjective validation of
constraints on experience. Unlike in intertheoretic reduction,
some of the constraints may be “lost” in the process. For example,
as our color-deprived Mary very well knows, the qualia of colors
are “lost” in this sense. Of course, this loss cannot be deduced
from the mere fact of a rose being destroyed in the process of an
experiment, yet the following discussion shall convince us of a
deep connection between the destruction of objects for the sake of
empirical knowledge and the limited accessibility of qualia.
Objective existence is discovered as a commonality of
observations across a range of experimental setups and individual
observers. For this common referential space to be achieved,
objective descriptions must function as recipes for the reproduc-
tion of experimental outcomes by different observers in different
circumstances. Not merely a list of properties or parts of an
object, such descriptions must recount the processes that produce
the object. The description of colors as electromagnetic interac-
tions, for example, is the basis of a successful communication
between Mary and Peter because it is a recipe for the replication
of the experience of color.
All sufficiently patient and fortunate observers discover how
such a replication can be performed. Their experience validates a
general theory, which covers the object, the circumstances of the
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experiment, and the measurement instruments. The definition of
an object in terms of such a theory includes the conditions of its
creation or discovery. For example, once colors are defined in
terms of fundamental physics, we know how to reproduce them,
and any additional information about the measurement instru-
ments becomes irrelevant. If such a definition is available, it can
be used to factor out the unphysical, that is to say, non-objective
information.
This construction reveals the existence of a common reality
accessible to all observers, and it makes an intersubjective
consensus about physical facts possible. Can this redefinition
(“fundamental description”) implement the idea of objectivity as
an ontological status? To answer this question, let us demon-
strate that this common reality entails not just common
properties of objects but, indeed, an ontological limit on the
individuation of objects.
Individuation is incomplete, and objective description is finite.
First, consider the following objection to the very idea of com-
mon reality as the foundation of objectivity: While some uni-
formity of nature may be necessary for scientific discovery, is it
not enough for the creation of intersubjectively valid empirical
judgments that objects have some common properties? In this
case, the world would consist of physical facts, which one could
describe with indefinite precision. We would establish the
existence of these facts, moreover, under certain descriptions
experimentally, which would require some uniformity of nature.
This uniformity is, however, an epistemological rather than an
ontological requirement. It is merely a cognitive condition for
empirical discovery. Although this uniformity might reflect
some relational or even non-relational properties, these prop-
erties would be part of the objective description of each parti-
cular object. They would not need to constitute a Platonic reality
“behind” particular objects.
Despite its intuitive appeal, this argument is, however,
untenable. According to it, the accumulation of empirical
knowledge increases one’s ability to differentiate facts, events,
and objects either relationally or non-relationally. This means
that new empirical data will, at some point, either contradict any
specific theory or else not be covered by any sufficiently general
theory, yet objective empirical knowledge cannot be expressed in
terms of facts available only to one observer because objectivity
means derivability from a general theory. This is an uncomfor-
table situation. Defined as the communicability of a description as
a recipe for replication, the separation between appearance and
reality is inconsistent with the unlimited individuation of physical
objects. Indeed, if one individuates objects so that no object is like
any other, all knowledge becomes idiosyncratic, and the
difference between appearance and reality disappears. Suppose,
moreover, that a miracle happens and we become fully capable of
individuating an object by including within its description an
answer to the question of why it exists. The object cannot be
replicated because obtaining a copy of it invalidates the
assumption that its existence is implicit in its description. This
means that the concept of objective existence does not admit
simultaneously to complete individuation and objective descrip-
tions as replication recipes.
One concludes that common reality is not merely an epistemic
condition for the discovery of natural regularities but an
ontological constraint on individuation. This limit on individua-
tion results from a trade-off between two dimensions of
objectivity: intersubjective validation and constraints on expected
experience. There is a point at which everything about an object
that is transcendental to its observed appearance is absorbed into
an objective description. This description must necessarily be
finite because only a finite amount of detail about an object is
compatible with common reality, as shown above.
Objective uncertainty: a link to scientific practice. The question
is how such finite individuation affects the constraints on
expected experience. In other words, one requires a connection
between the metaphysical demand for a limit on individuation
and the practice of empirical science. One needs a mechanism, in
other words, which would make finite the amount of physical
information carried by this particular rose reduced to the com-
mon reality. It seems that science does supply such a mechanism.
An objective description of an object is a recipe for the
experimental reproduction of this object. How does one learn that
a particular description is, indeed, such a recipe? Apparently, ones
does so by conducting an experiment. To be more precise, one
could run a series of experiments to validate or invalidate the
objectivity claim, that is to say, the independence of a description
from a particular point of view. Eventually, such experiments will
validate or invalidate a theory describing the common reality. If
individuation is finite, one will fail to differentiate between
replicas of objects. How then would this affect the expected
experience? Such a limit on individuation would appear to the
observers as uncertainty, that is to say, as a lack of constraint on
the expected experience. However, this uncertainty would derive
not from a lack of knowledge about the object to be reduced to
the common reality but from the finiteness of information that
one extracts in the course of the reduction to a common reality.
Quantum physics provides a particular physical realization of
such objective uncertainty. Heisenberg describes the situation
excellently in his famous “uncertainty paper”:
Thus, a given experiment can never provide precise
information on all quantum mechanics variables: rather,
it divides the physical variables into “known” and
“unknown” (or: more or less precisely known variables),
in a manner characteristic for that experiment. The results
of two experiments can be derived precisely from each
other only when the two experiments divide the physical
variables in the same manner into “known” and “unknown”
(i.e., if the tensors in that multidimensional space already
used for visualization are “viewed” from the same direction,
in both experiments). If two experiments cause two
different distributions into “known” and “unknown”
variables, then the relation of the results of those
experiments can be given appropriately only statistically.
(Heisenberg, 1983, p. 13)
Heisenberg’s intent was to visualize (to make anschaulich, to
use the original term) this situation using the matrix mechanics,
specifically, the non-commutativity of matrices representing
different observables. One can also visualize a fundamental
description as a limit to the compatibility of various intersubjec-
tively valid constraints on expected experience. Not all constraints
are compatible because the creation of one constraint in the
course of experiments may prevent another from appearing. As
objects are defined in terms of experimental setups only, it is
impossible to circumvent this trade-off between experimental
setups. To use the somewhat obsolete metaphor of experiments as
disturbances, one experimental setup prevents another from
being realized. Further accumulation of empirical evidence does
not decrease this objective uncertainty. Instead, elimination and
creation of uncertainty balance one another. The parameters of
this trade-off define a fundamental description as a point at which
there is no empirical difference between the production of the
object in the process of the experiment and its discovery as a
result of the experiment.
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This objective uncertainty is, indeed, a constraint on
individuation as defined above. As an elementary example, one
cannot measure both position and momentum with indefinite
precision. An elementary particle in a certain position cannot be
arrested in its motion to establish it as different from all others
and thus further individuate it. This microphysical situation
transpires at the macrolevel: Peter has to destroy at least one rose
to obtain sufficiently precise knowledge about the molecular
supervenience base of colors.
To summarize, the common reality as the basis of inter-
subjective validity is not a common “essence” of things or of their
constituent parts but the common manner of objects’ transfor-
mations in the process of empirical discovery. The parameters of
such transformations constrain individuation and define the
trade-off between two aspects of objectivity. For the reasons that
follow, this common reality retains its relevance as the basis of
intersubjective validation regardless of the amount of empirical
information accumulated through experiments. As empirical
knowledge grows, descriptions of objects are finitely reduced to
the point at which no observable difference exists between the
creation of these objects by an experimenter and their discovery
by an observer. At this point, an experiment “creates” an object
that cannot be further individuated, that is to say, differentiated
from identical objects created by other runs of the same
procedure. Experimental setups thus fully define physical objects.
Two points are in order here. First, the structure of objective
uncertainty constrains the expected experience, and one discovers
this constraint only in the course of multiple observations. Its
existence can only be statistically tested, which fits the notion of a
common reality discovered solely by varying experimental setups.
Second, this structure is contingent. It could have been different
and perhaps will be different, which means that a fundamental
description is only fundamental in a very limited sense, namely,
as a statistically discovered limit on individuation.
As an aside, the concept of finite fundamental descriptions may
lead to an interpretation of quantum physics that is both realist and
free from the ontological baggage of structures and tropes. The
latter responds to the need to change the ontology radically in the
face of a radically transformed scientific image of the world, in
particular to get rid of “things” or substances (such as classically
construed particles) as the basic constituents of the universe. These
strategies reflect neither the radical change that quantum physics
introduced—objective uncertainty—nor the phenomenon of a
common reality accessible to all observers. It also fails to reflect the
connection between these two. Neither particles nor relations (e.g.,
symmetries) nor qualities (nor tropes) deliver the commonality of
experience that is the basis for the objective description of the
world. Nor do these concepts enable us to understand the
informational cost of achieving an intersubjectively validated
reduction of uncertainty. The construal of fundamental descrip-
tions as a limit on certainty for empirical knowledge does both.
However, we shall not explore this hypothesis further at this point.
Objectivity as an ontological status. We began with the idea that
objectivity is a two-dimensional ontological status attached to
descriptions rather than a property of an object or its description. A
description is objective as long as it constrains expected experience
and this constraint is intersubjectively valid. No physical quality
characterizes an objective description qua objective. Instead, an
objective description is a redefinition of an object in terms of
experimental access available for all (or all relevant) observers. Thus
defined, objectivity requires the existence of a common reality and
finite individuation, the epistemic price of which is objective
uncertainty. In the next section, I will demonstrate that this con-
struction also resolves the paradox of duplication.
Limits on empirical knowledge and the equivalence of two
uncertainties: a solution to the duplication paradox
This section employs the above construction of objective uncer-
tainty in the physical world to eliminate the paradox of dupli-
cation. It must be said at the outset that the following discussion
has no relation to the so-called “quantum mind” tradition that
supposes the co-production of quantum effects by consciously
performed measurement, which is an empirically unwarranted
interpretation of the von Neumann model of quantum mea-
surement. Generally treated by mainstream science as a mis-
interpretation of physics, this tradition attempts either to use
consciousness as an effectively hidden variable for explaining
away the epistemic unease caused by quantum uncertainty or to
consider the subjective a product of quantum processes. One
effectively claims the discovery of new empirical facts, which are,
however, construed in such a way that the respective theories
cannot be verified or falsified empirically. In full opposition to
this approach, I will demonstrate that two observable limits to
empirical knowledge—the subjective side of human experience
and objective uncertainty—are actually one.
Finite individuation appears to observers as a trade-off
between the precisions of different observations. The reduction
of uncertainty about one thing or variable imposes a limit on
such a reduction for another. The details of an objectively given
common reality define the parameters of this trade-off. This
limit on intersubjectively validated empirical knowledge is
incompatible with the paradoxical duplication of physical
information. To sketch the argument, the duplication is
equivalent to the enhancement of a finite objective description
with additional information. If successful, the duplication
would have decreased objective uncertainty. From the point of
view of the observer, however, this would entail an enhance-
ment of the intersubjective consensus beyond what can be
achieved by reduction to fundamental descriptions. From an
ontological point of view, the limit on individuation implies
that existence is not physical information, that is to say, not part
of an intersubjectively valid description. This destroys the
duplication paradox. It would, however, be interesting to con-
sider this in more detail.
Two uncertainties and their identity. As argued above, sub-
jectivity is ontologically paradoxical because it can only describe
itself via knowledge of its own and other objects’ existence. This is
the ontological side of the duplication paradox: the physical
supervenience base of subjectivity must contain existence as a
physical quality. As long as one lacks knowledge of this super-
venience base, one experiences subjective phenomena as an
epistemic and ontological caesura in the causal order of things,
namely, as an irreducible contingency that cannot be explained
away. In other words, a subjective phenomenon is something that
exists because it is “observed” or “experienced” and, as such,
appears to us as excluded from intersubjectively valid explana-
tions (i.e., recipes for the replication of objects of experience).
One faces a dilemma: either existence is a predicate, and
physical information is duplicated, or there is an epistemic
caesura. In the latter case, the subjective is experienced as
fundamentally contingent in the sense that its emergence is not
explainable by causal regularities. The philosophy of mind tends
to assume that, even if consciousness remains unexplained, this
explanatory gap is not an obstacle to other explanations. If the
contingency of the subjective is experienced as our inability to
include existence into physical descriptions, however, this
contingency must pose such an obstacle. It must be part of
conscious beings’ uncertainty about the physical world. The
argument is as follows.
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One already encountered another ontological and epistemic
caesura: the reduction of a red rose to the fundamental object led,
first, to the destruction of the rose and, then, to the discovery of
limits to intersubjectively valid knowledge. Similar to conscious-
ness, these limits ensure that the existence of an object cannot be
reduced to a piece of physical information. It is, therefore,
tempting to identify the caesura produced by subjectivity with
the objective limits to certainty. On the face of it, it is not
immediately clear what this identity could mean. Objective
quantum uncertainty is an empirically discovered and quantifi-
able phenomenon. On the contrary, subjectivity is an obstacle to
the quantification of experience. Nevertheless, the following
construction shows that their identity does make sense. An act of
observation posits something as existing under a description, yet
the description itself does not imply the existence of the object.
The intersubjective validation of the respective constraints on
experience defines the ontological status of the description, that is
to say, the existence or non-existence of the object in question.
The process of maximizing intersubjectively valid constraints on
experience is finite; in other words, it terminates in a fundamental
description. The latter’s definition implies limits to intersubjective
validation in the form of trade-offs between experimental setups,
and this means that the consensus on matters of fact between
different observers will forever be limited. Let us now consider
what would happen if an observer attempted to decrease the
quantum uncertainty of a system by carefully observing its
interaction with the measurement apparatus and the environ-
ment. The nature of objective uncertainty is such that it cannot
be removed by tracing the observer–object interaction. Tracing
the process of observation, the observer would, therefore, face the
same constraints on precision that arise from objective uncer-
tainty. This is because objective uncertainty is a universal feature
of the object, the measurement apparatus, and the environment
(see the discussion of the common reality above).
It is only natural to conjecture that the same would happen if
one tried to observe the duplication of physical information in the
act of observation, that is to say, to implement physically the
above thought experiment. Unless one improved upon quantum
uncertainty by adding a macrolevel regularity to the fundamental
description, one would encounter an obstacle: the objectively
given trade-off in the precision of measurements. This trade-off
would appear to the observer as a “disturbance” caused by the act
of observation, which would make it impossible to identify the
supervenience bases of conscious states. As a result, the thought
experiment and the duplication of information become physically
impossible.
In this construction, objective uncertainty makes the caesura of
consciousness possible. Maximizing the objectivity of descrip-
tions, one discovers the precision trade-off. In turn, this trade-off
makes it impossible for the observer to close the circle by securing
an objective description of the process of observation itself.
The path of discovering objective uncertainty is subject to the
same objective uncertainty, and this lack of certainty in the world
is thus the same as (not “caused by”) the epistemic caesura
produced by the subjective.
Conclusion: a limit on empirical knowledge as an ontological
proposition
Consciousness is knowledge of one’s own existence as well as the
existence of other things. If we were able to develop a recipe for
the reproduction of consciousness, which allowed us to reproduce
it, there would exist an object, one of properties of which would
be its existence. This conclusion, however, defies the metaphysical
intuition that existence is not a property and, more importantly,
leads to the duplication paradox.
The paradox is avoided, however, because it requires an
objective description of a conscious state, and the above argument
demonstrates that such a description is not possible. Indeed, the
intersubjective validation of experience-constraining descriptions
requires the existence of a common reality. The reduction of
objects to this common reality must be finite, and therefore, the
individuation of objects is always limited. Any object has a finite
fundamental description. This limit on individuation appears to
the observer as non-eliminable objective uncertainty, that is to
say, quantum uncertainty. We also note an equivalence of two
limits to the intersubjective validity of empirical descriptions,
namely the conscious qualities of experience and the quantum
qualities of physical reality. In the most pragmatic terms, this
limit can be seen as follows. We can achieve various degrees of
intersubjective consensus on atoms, chairs, roses, and even qualia
and emotions. This consensus depends on the objectivity of the
respective descriptions. A more objective description generates a
greater consensus; in other words, it is more intersubjectively
valid, and there is no way around it. People agree on tables more
often than they do on qualia. The fact that Mary knows basic
physics is strictly less intersubjectively valid than basic physics
itself. This is because we encounter limits on intersubjectively
valid empirical knowledge: Knowledge is paid for with uncer-
tainty. To communicate the physical meaning of the color red to
Mary, Peter must destroy the rose—unless, of course, enough
roses and other objects have been destroyed already for him to
study the physics, chemistry, and biology of colors, petals, and
eyes from books. This invasive character of knowledge acquisition
reflects objective uncertainty in the form of a trade-off between
different components of knowledge. Quantum limits to inter-
subjective validation make the duplication of physical informa-
tion impossible and thus can be seen as the validation of the
metaphysical postulate that existence is not a property. This is the
solution to the ontological puzzle of consciousness as something
whose description carries information about its existence. There
is simply no such an intersubjectively valid description. That
existence is not a property is thus an obstacle to empirical
knowledge and not a result of conceptual gerrymandering. This
obstacle transpires in the existence of subjective consciousness,
which is capable of knowing objects as objectively existing.
This construction is unusual and even counterintuitive in the
sense that it contradicts the received wisdom on the empirical
irrelevance of metaphysics. The idea that existence is not a
property is not new. What are novel, however, are its empirical
implications. The objective description of an object is the one that
consists in an explanation of how the object can be transformed
into other objects. Such a description cannot be refined to include
something that distinguishes the object from its copies. It does
not refer to the as-yet undiscovered “essence” of a given (“pos-
ited”) object, which could have pinned down this object’s exis-
tence. A full description of the physical world is not possible.
The epistemic caesura of subjectivity is, indeed, ontological.
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